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ECONOMIC POLICY, MODEL UNCERTAINTY AND
ELECTIONS
WILKO LETTERIE AND OTTO H. SWANK
We analyse a game theoretical model in which policy makers have superior
knowledge about the working of the economy relative to voters. We show
that parties increase their chances of reelection by basing their policies on
the model that best ®ts in with their preferences. Moreover, we show that if
parties care much about holding oce, they may deliberately base their
policies on a model that is electorally attractive, even if this model does not
describe the working of the economy correctly. Our paper provides an
explanation for the observation that dierent political parties subscribe to
dierent economic philosophies.
Economists disagree. On almost every topic they produce a wide variety of
models and they are rarely, if ever, able to show the superiority of one of them.
Disagreement on the correct model of the economy may have important
implications for economic policy. Frankel and Rockett (1988), for example,
demonstrate that international policy coordination may be sub-optimal when
governments in dierent countries have dierent perceptions of how the
economy works (see also Ghosh and Masson, 1991 and Holtham and Hughes
Hallett, 1992).
In recent years, the concept of model uncertainty has mainly been used in the
international cooperation literature. However, within countries, discussions
among policy makers about macro economic policy also tend to revolve around
how the economy works (Schultze, 1989). Several authors have noted that
dierent political parties subscribe to dierent economic philosophies. Tobin
(1972), for instance, contends that in the early seventies conservatives were often
monetarists and liberals Keynesians. Harris (1961) and Tufte (1978) notice that
in the United States, Republicans show much more faith in the invisible hand
than Democrats. Christodoulakis and van der Ploeg (1987) observe a similar
phenomenon in Great Britain. It is striking that these authors observe a
relationship between the political positions of political parties and their views on
how the economy works. This indicates that model selection contains a political
element.
In virtually all existing studies on model uncertainty the political element in
choosing an economic philosophy is ignored. Frankel and Rockett (1988) take
policy makers' beliefs as to how the economy works as exogenous. In Ghosh and
Masson (1991), policy makers' beliefs are endogenous in the sense that they are
updated in a Bayesian manner when new information about the economy
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existence of diverging views on the working of the economy.
Recently, political economic studies have not paid much attention to model
uncertainty. The usual assumption is that economic and political agents all share
a common economic model. There are two exceptions. The ®rst is the paper by
Harrington (1993). Harrington's model revolves around voters caring about
income, and policy makers caring about income and holding oce. The key
feature of the model is that voters dier in their prior beliefs as to how policy
aects income. These prior beliefs are updated when new information about the
economy becomes available. Unlike voters, policy makers are dogmatic: their
beliefs as to how the economy works do not change over time. Though policy
makers' beliefs are private information, voters can make inferences about them
from past policies. Harrington shows that in this setting, the policy maker in
oce is inclined to implement policy that is well received by voters, rather than
policy that in his view maximizes income. One of the virtues of Harrington's
paper is that it provides insight into how model uncertainty may lead to strategic
behaviour of the incumbent. However, the model cannot explain the
phenomenon observed above that dierent political parties subscribe to dierent
economic philosophies. In fact, Harrington shows that when parties' economic
philosophies dier ex ante, they tend to converge ex post.
The second exception is a model developed by Roemer (1994) in which two
political parties representing dierent groups in society compete by announcing
a policy and an economic theory when voters are uncertain about how the
economy works. Under the assumption that voters' perception of the working of
the economy is aected by policy makers' announcement of the economic theory
to which they subscribe and that political parties are fully informed about
voters' preferences, Roemer shows that the policies announced by parties fully
converge but that the parties announce dierent economic theories. The model
employed in this paper deviates from Roemer's model in that we focus on
policies rather than on announcements and explicitly model how voters update
their beliefs about how the economy works when new information becomes
available.
This paper analyses the implications of asymmetric information about how
the economy works for partisan policies. We develop a two-period model in
which political parties possess an information advantage about the ecacy of
policy. There exist two models of the economy. At the beginning of the game
``nature'' draws a model, being the correct model of the system in both periods.
This model is revealed to the parties, but not to the voters. At the end of period 1
elections are held. Voters, being heterogenous in their preferences over economic
goals but having the same prior beliefs as to how the economy works, do not
observe economic outcomes and are therefore uncertain about the working of
the system when casting their ballots. As a consequence, election outcomes
depend on voters' beliefs about the ecacy of policy. Due to this, the policy
maker has an incentive to make voters believe in one of the models of the
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low costs to unemployment wants voters to believe in a model which predicts
that in¯ation has no impact on unemployment. Voters can make inferences
about the working of the system from policy in period 1. This enables the
incumbent to aect voters' beliefs by basing policy in period 1 on the ``desired''
model, rather than on the correct model. If the policy maker's incentive to
increase his chances of reelection is strong enough, he will base policy on the
model which best ®ts in with his preferences.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. This
model is related to the model developed by Alesina and Cukierman (1990).
There are two political parties which have dierent preferences over economic
goals, because they represent dierent constituencies (see also Hibbs, 1977).
Voters are modelled as rational forward-looking agents. In contrast to Alesina
and Cukeriman (1990), voters are uncertain about how the economy works,
rather than about the policy maker's preferences. In addition, our model diers
from previous studies in that policy makers cannot costlessly implement their
most desired policies, because they are constrained by the actions of other
political agents, like bureaucrats and Congress. Thus in our model, policy
makers are not fully ¯exible in choosing policy as in Alesina and Cukierman, but
they are more ¯exible than the policy makers in Harrington's model in which the
incumbent can only choose between two policy alternatives. In section 3, we
analyse the optimization problem the incumbent faces in period 1. We show that
by basing policy on the ``wrong'' model of the economy, the incumbent party
may increase its chances of reelection. Section 4 discusses the possible equilibria
of the model. We show that if policy makers attach a high value to being in oce
a pooling equilibrium exists in which dierent political parties adopt dierent
views of the economy. Section 5 concludes this paper.
1. THE MODEL
We consider a two-party system, with party ` and r, which lasts two periods. In
the ®rst period party ` is in oce. At the beginning of the second period elections
are held after which the winning party takes oce. The parties care about two
interrelated issues, x which also serves as instrument variable and y, as well as
about being in oce. In addition, in conducting policy, parties are constrained.
They attach costs to deviations of the instrument variable from a benchmark, xc.
Due to this, the governing party cannot costlessly implement its most desired
policy. Parties' utility functions are additively separable in utility received from x
and y, holding oce and deviations of x from xc. If a party were not interested in
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where bi measures the costs party i attaches to x2 relative to y, q is the discount
factor and t is a time index. The last term of (1) implies that parties are
constrained in implementing policy. Though this feature of the model is rather
unconventional, it seems plausible for most economic and political settings.
There are various possible interpretations of this term. One interpretation
pertains to the problem of executing policy. In most, if not all, countries, the
governing party does not completely control the apparatus of the state. In this
context, the role of bureaucrats is well-known. A straightforward interpretation
is that xc represents the policy most desired by bureaucrats and that a is an
inverse measure of the extent to which the incumbent party is able to control (or
monitor) bureaucrats. Alternatively, xc may represent the policy most preferred
by other political agents, such as Congress members (cf. Alesina and Rosenthal,
1989), foreign policy makers (international agreements) or the central bank. In
this setting, a may serve as a measure of bargaining power.
We have deliberately ignored the possibility that xc  xtÿ1, indicating that
policy makers attach costs to deviating policy from the status quo, which can be
motivated by for instance uncertainty concerning distributive eects of policy
(cf. Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). The reason for abstaining from this
additional source of dynamics is that we want to focus on the strategic
implications of policy for the beliefs of voters regarding the working of the
economy. Allowing xc  xtÿ1 would complicate the analysis in two ways. First,
the incumbent has an incentive to constrain the policy range for the future policy
maker. This issue has been treated by for example Tabellini and Alesina (1990)
and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992). Secondly, as we will show later
xc aects voter behaviour. If xc  xtÿ1 then a policy maker may aect his
reelection prospects by choosing an appropriate value for x. This incentive arises
as a result of a policy maker's desire to attract votes by means of choosing a
middle of the road platform. This aspect has been discussed in the literature
dealing with spatial voting models.
The precise interpretation of xc is not the focus of this paper. What matters is
that ``political'' costs may induce parties not to implement the policy they desire
from an ideological and/or opportunistic point of view. We assume that (1) gives
utility of party i regardless of whether it is in oce or not.1
Following Hibbs (1977) and Alesina (1987) we assume that the two parties
represent dierent constituencies, so that they attribute dierent costs to x2.
Throughout this paper, it is assumed that party r attributes higher costs to x2
than party ` (br > b`). The linear-quadratic speci®cation of the utility function is
common in models of model uncertainty (cf. Frankel and Rockett, 1988; Ghosh
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mathematical convenience.
As mentioned above, the issues x and y are interrelated. There exist two
models describing the relationship between x and y:
model 1: yt  r1  xt  s1 r1 < 0 2
model 2: yt  r2  xt  s2 r1 < r2 < 0. 3
Because of periodic regime switches, in some periods the (economic) system is
described by model 1, and in other periods by model 2. The parameters of the
models are ®xed and common knowledge. The assumption that r1 < r2 < 0 is
made to facilitate the discussion of the results, but does not alter the conclusions
of this paper qualitatively.2 What matters is that r1 6 r2. The parameters s1 and
s2 can be interpreted as exogenous eects on yt, but do not play a role in the
model. At the beginning of period 1, before x1 is chosen, nature draws a model
which will describe the relationship between x and y over the whole game. Thus
if nature draws model 1, the working of the economy will be described by
equation (2) for both period 1 and 2. The a priori probability that model 1 is
chosen is r1 and the a priori probability that model 2 is chosen is 1 ÿ r1. One of
the key features of our model is that parties possess an information advantage
about the relationship between x and y compared to voters. To model that
parties have superior knowledge concerning the working of the economy, we
assume that parties know which model is drawn, or to put it dierently, which
model is ``correct'', while voters only know the a priori probabilities that each
model is correct. At election time, voters do not know the realisation of y1. Due
to this, they cannot infer information about the working of the economy by just
comparing x1 and y1.3
Except for the ecacy of policy, voters are fully informed at election time:
they know parties' utility functions, the parameters of the two models and that
the parties possess private information about the relationship between x and y.
Voters may make inferences about the working of the economy on the basis of
policy in period 1. We assume that the incumbent party has to base its policy, x1,
on either model 1 or model 2 (see section 3). Due to this the policy maker has a
discrete choice set. This assumption is made for reasons of tractability. One way
of looking at this action space is that policy makers rely on policy advisors and
that two types of advisors exist. The ®rst type of advisor bases his advice on
model 1 and the second type on model 2. Since voters know the optimization
problem the governing party faces, they are able to determine whether the
observed x1 is based on model 1 or model 2. Alternatively, in the advisor setting
ECONOMIC POLICY, MODEL UNCERTAINTY AND ELECTIONS 89
2As it will be shown later, the assumption that r1 and r2 are negative implies that xt is always
positive. In line with this, we assume xc > 0
3Without aecting the results of this paper qualitatively, this assumption can be replaced with the
assumption that voters only observe economic outcomes. What matters is that voters cannot infer
information about the economy by just comparing x1 and y1.
&Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998.voters observe the type of advisor consulted by the policy maker. However,
voters remain uncertain about the working of the economy, since the party in
oce may try to fool voters, e.g. by basing policy on model 1, when model 2 is
correct. In the next section, we will argue that in equilibrium party ` has no
incentive to base policy in period 1 on model 2 if model 1 is correct.
Analogously, party r has no incentive to signal the ``wrong'' model if model 2 is
correct. Let p be a shift variable taking the value 1 if model 1 is correct and
taking the value 0 if model 2 is correct. Furthermore, let x11 x10 be the
policy party ` follows in period 1 when its policy is based on model 1 (2) and p be
the probability assigned by voters to the event that party ` bases its policy on
model 1 when model 2 is correct. Under the above assumptions, Bayes' rule
suggests that voters should revise their prior beliefs about the working of the
economy, r1, according to
r2  Prob model 1 is true: x1 
r1  Prob x1: model 1 is true
Prob x1
. 4
where r2 is the posterior probability that model 1 is correct. We assume that
x11 is a better policy to convince voters that model 1 is valid than x10. As we
will show in section 3 this assumption implies that if x1  x11 is observed then
r2 
r1
r1  1 ÿ r1  p
5
and if x1  x10 is observed then r2  0.
In making their vote decisions, voters are rational, forward-looking agents:
they cast their ballots for the party which oers them highest expected utility.
Like parties, their preferences over x and y are represented by linear-quadratic
utility functions. Unlike parties, voters do not attach costs to deviations of xt
from xc. As mentioned before, the third term in (1) represents a (political)
constraint which is only relevant for parties. Let x2;i and y2;i denote the values of
x2 and y2, respectively, if party i is elected. Voter j's expected utility derived from
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depends on voters' beliefs about the working of the economy (through y2;i) and
on the expectation of the squared value of x2;i. Voters are assumed to be fully
rational. Hence expectations are based on their knowledge about the
optimization problem parties face, if elected in period 2. In period 2, the party
in oce does not face an electoral constraint. As a consequence, the dominant
strategy of the incumbent simply results from maximizing utility it receives from
x2;i and y2;i, subject to the correct model of the economy. Hence, in period 2, x2;i
becomes:
x2;i 
1 ÿ a  xc ÿ a  p  r1  1 ÿ p  r2
1 ÿ a  a  bi
:  x2;ip. 9
Since b` < br, x2;`p > x2;rp. Using (2), (3) and (9), y2;i becomes
y2;i  p  r1  1 ÿ p  r2  x2;ip  p  s1  1 ÿ p  s2:  y2;ip 10
Voters know that period 2 policy is based on x2;ip and that economic outcomes
in the second period are given by y2;ip. However, voters do not know the actual
value of p. The optimal forecast of p results from Bayes' rule (see equation 5).
Hence, p is 1 with probability r2 and p is 0 with probability 1 ÿ r2. Therefore4
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Substitution of (9) for i  ` and r into (13) leads after tedious but
straightforward algebra to
T  ÿ2 
r2  r1  1 ÿ a  xc ÿ a  r1  1 ÿ r2  r2  1 ÿ a  xc ÿ a  r2
fr2  1 ÿ a  xc ÿ a  r1
2  1 ÿ r2  1 ÿ a  xc ÿ a  r2
2g  
f1 ÿ a  a  b`









Voters are heterogenous. They dier in the preference weight they attribute to x.
We assume that there is a continuum of voters in terms of bj. Let bm denote the
preference weight of the median voter. Equation (13) indicates that if bm < T,
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setting parties need only be concerned with the preference weight of the median
voter, bm. However, bm is not known with certainty, but randomly distributed
over the interval 0, 1 with probability density function fbm. The statistical
properties of bm are common knowledge. Using the statistical properties of bm,
the probability that party ` wins the elections equals:5




As in Alesina (1988), the probability function, P`, exhibits the usual features
of spatial voting models: (1) 04 P` 41 and (2) @P`=@b` > 0 and
@P`=@br > 0. The second feature implies that if the preference parameter of
one party moves towards the preference parameter of the other party, it
increases its chances of winning the elections.
The probability P` depends on the beliefs that voters hold about the
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Equation (16) shows that if political costs are absent, a  1, then
@P`=@r2  0. In that case the probability that party ` wins the elections is
independent of which model is correct and only depends on the preference
weights voters and parties attribute to x2
2. Hence, in the absence of political
costs, voters need not to be concerned with the working of the economy and
need only to compare their preferences with parties' preferences.
However, if political costs are present (0 < a < 1), P` depends on voters'
perception of the working of the economy as can be seen from (16). Since
r2 ÿ r1 > 0 and x2;`p > x2;rp, @P`=@r2 > 0. Hence, the higher voters' belief
that model 1 is correct, the higher is the probability that party ` wins the
elections. To understand this result, suppose that some voter, say voter v, would
be indierent to party ` and r if model 2 were the correct model of the economy.
This implies that voter v's bliss point, xv, lies exactly between the policies party `
and r are expected to follow: jxe
2;` ÿ xvj  jxv ÿ xe
2;rj. Now suppose that model 1
turns out to be the correct model. Due to this, voter v's bliss point and x2;i rise.
But since parties are constrained in implementing their most desired policies
(equation 9), voter v's bliss point increases more than xe
2;i. This implies that
92 LETTERIE AND SWANK
5We ignore the non interesting cases P`  1 and P`  0.
&Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998.under model 1 jxe
2;` ÿ xvj < jxv ÿ xe
2;rj. Thus voter v who is indierent to party `
and r if model 2 is correct, votes for party ` if model 1 holds.
1.1 An Example
Above we have discussed the basic ingredients of our framework. Because we
believe that the basic idea behind our model is relevant for several policy issues
where policy makers face a trade-o between two objectives (equity±eciency,
publicactivity±private activity,economicgrowth±environmentalprotection, etc.)
we have not yet labelled x and y. In this section we discuss the plausibility of the
main assumptions underlying our model when it is applied to stabilization policy.
Let y denote unemployment and x denote in¯ation, so that (1) relates policy
makers' utility to unemployment and in¯ation, and (2) and (3) describe two
con¯icting views of the Phillips curve. As to the utility function, three
assumptions are important. First, political parties and voters dier in their
preferences over economic goals. This assumption is a point of departure of
partisan models of stabilization policy (Hibbs, 1977 and Alesina, 1987). In
partisan models, political parties promote the interests of their core constitu-
encies. Applied to the U.S., the core constituencies of the Democratic party
consist of lower income groups and those of the Republican party consist of
higher income groups. Individuals dier in their preferences over in¯ation and
unemployment because macroeconomic ¯uctuations have distributional eects.
Lower income groups particularly suer from unemployment while higher
income groups particularly suer from in¯ation. Various authors report
evidence supporting the partisan theory of stabilization policy. Unemployment
tends to be higher under Republican administrations and in¯ation tends to be
higher under Democratic administrations (see Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995 for a
survey of this literature).
The second assumption is that voters are aware of political parties'
preferences. There are two reasons why we believe they are. First, Swank
(1993 and 1995) ®nds strong support for voter models, in which voters are
assumed to take political parties' preferences into account when casting their
ballots. The second reason is that political parties are not unambiguous about
their preferences. Tufte (1978) compares the rate of usage of ``unemployment''
and ``in¯ation'' in the Economic Report of the president. In reports of
Democratic presidents ``unemployment'' is used twice as often as ``in¯ation'',
while in reports of Republican presidents ``in¯ation'' is mentioned 1.7 times as
often as ``unemployment''.
The third assumption is that political parties are constrained in implementing
policy. This assumption seems also consistent with empirical work. In a partisan
model without a policy constraint the economy would jump from one point on
the Phillips curve to another point. This is not what empirical work usually
reports. Reduced form equations of unemployment (or in¯ation) include lagged
terms which indicates that the economy gradually moves along the Phillips
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without adjustment costs of changing policy instruments against a model with
adjustment costs.
As to the economic constraints, two assumptions are essential. The ®rst
assumption is that model uncertainty exists. Globally model uncertainty can be
interpreted in two ways. First, reality is too complex to be captured by a single
model. The eects of economic policy depend on the state of the economy. For
example, in recessions the eect of expansionary policy on unemployment may
be larger than in economic booms.6 Alternatively, there exist competing models
of the economy and there is no consensus about which model is correct.
Economic theory indeed oers various con¯icting views of the Phillips curve.
Some theories suggest that there is a potential role for the government of
stabilization of real variables, while other theories imply that all policy makers'
attempts to stabilize unemployment are doomed to fail. Among professional
economists the dominant view of the Phillips curve has changed over time.
Because consensus has not been reached yet, economists' views will probably
change in the future as well. In principle, the spirit of our model ®ts with both
interpretations of model uncertainty. What is important is that the policy maker
is better informed about the state of the economy or better informed about the
dominant view among economists concerning the Phillips curve than voters.
The second assumption as to the economic constraints is that voters are not
able to infer the correct model of the economy from contemporaneous
outcomes. In our model it is assumed that voters observe the policy selected
but not outcomes. This assures that voters remain uncertain about the working
of the economy as time elapses. Likewise, we could have assumed that voters
observe outcomes, but not policies. Macroeconomic studies suggesting that
aggregate demand policy aects in¯ation and unemployment with dierent lags
abound. The usual ®nding is that expansionary policy aects in¯ation two years
later than unemployment.
Above we have tried to show that the basic framework of our theoretical
model can be applied to stabilization policy. Let us now elaborate upon the main
message of our paper. The basic point we try to make is that in a partisan world
the selection of a model to base policy on contains a strategic element. The idea
is simple. In a partisan world, the policies supplied by political parties dier. In
our example, the left wing party pursues more expansionary policy than the right
wing party. In order to win the elections, parties have to sell their policies to
voters. Apart from preferences, the desirability of policies depends on the
structure of the economy. For example, if voters believe that the Phillips curve is
¯at, the demand for expansionary policy will be low. Due to this, the right wing
party in our model, has an incentive to make voters believe that expansionary
policy has adverse eects. Likewise, the left wing party wants to convince the
electorate, that expansionary policy has favourable eects. The question remains
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Of course parties may announce their views of the economy. However, such
announcements are hardly credible as rational voters will understand the
background of such announcements. Policy makers' announcements become
credible (at least to some extent) if their actions are consistent with their
announcements. Thus a right wing policy maker may make voters believe in a
¯at Phillips curve if his policy is based on a ¯at Phillips curve. Obviously, if the
Phillips curve is not ¯at, such a strategy involves costs, because policy is based
on the wrong model. Whether or not the policy maker adheres to a speci®c
model of the economy depends on whether these costs exceed the electoral
bene®ts. The conditions under which political parties adhere to a speci®c model
are examined in the next section.
2. THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In period 1, party ` faces the problem of choosing between x11 and x10. This
choice is determined by the following optimization problem:
max: W1  W2 17
with respect to x1, subject to (15), where
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x1 ÿ xc
2  l
18
W2x1  q 





 a  b`  x
2
2;` ÿ 1 ÿ a 
1
2
 x2;` ÿ xc
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The parameter ll > 0 measures utility that party ` receives from holding oce.
W1 is period 1 utility, W2 is period 2 utility and p 2 f0, 1g. Period 1 utility is
simply the sum of utility party ` receives from x1 and y1, the costs attached to
deviations of x1 from xc and utility received from holding oce. Since, by
assumption party ` is in oce in period 1, l in (18) can be ignored in solving the
optimization problem. Equation (19) describes expected period 2 utility, since in
period 1 election outcomes are uncertain. Expected period 2 utility that party `
receives from x and y is given by the utility it receives from its own policy times
the probability that it is elected plus the utility it receives from x2;r times the
probability that party r is elected. l  P` denotes the expected utility that party `
receives from holding oce.
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optimal policies in period 2, x2;i. Equation (9) shows that policy in period 2 is
independent of x1. Hence, x1 only aects period 2 utility through its eects on
P`. Due to this, we can simplify (19) by omitting the terms which are not
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 q  P`  Z  l.
20
Z denotes the dierence between party `'s economic utility when party ` is in
oce and party `'s economic utility when party r is in oce. Since, in our model,
party ` always prefers its own policy to party r's policy, Z is always positive.
If in the above optimization problem, voters had known the correct model, p,
policy in period 1 would not aect period 2 utility, so that the dynamic
optimization problem could be split into two static optimization problems.
Hence, party ` would base x1 on the correct model as in (9). In the above
optimization problem, period 1 policy aects period 2 utility through its eect
on P`. In the previous section, we have shown that the higher voters' posterior
belief that model 1 is correct, the higher is the probability that party ` wins the
elections. Thus party ` increases its chances of reelection if it makes voters
believe that model 1 is the correct model of the economy, even if model 2 holds.
A similar optimization problem could be formulated if party r were assumed
to be in oce in period 1. However, equation (16) indicates that the higher
voters' posterior belief that model 1 is correct the lower is the probability that
party r wins the elections. As a consequence, party r has an incentive to make
voters believe that model 2 is correct and may bene®t from basing policy on
model 2 even if model 1 is correct.
3. EQUILIBRIA
Our model belongs to the class of signalling games. In our game there are two
kinds of players: a sender and receivers of a message. The incumbent party plays
the role of sender by choosing a message x1, to inform voters, who are the
receivers, about economic reality. There are two possible types that may
characterize a policy maker in period 1. These types correspond with the actual
model of the economy which is drawn by nature. A type 1 (2) policy maker is
incumbent if nature has drawn model 1 (2).
We assume that there are two possible actions for the incumbent. The ®rst is
basing policy on model 1, x11. The second is basing policy on model 2, x10.
There exist two distinct information sets. The ®rst corresponds to x11. Voters'
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x10. If policy is based on model 2 then voters' posterior beliefs are described by
m. Below, the values of s and m are determined.
As it is usual in this type of signalling games we can distinguish three types of
perfect Bayesian equilibria which occur depending on the parameter values of
the model. First, a separating equilibrium characterizes a situation where each
type of sender bases policy on a dierent model. Secondly, a pooling equilibrium
holds when both types base policy on the same economic model. Finally, a
hybrid equilibrium occurs when one of the types randomizes between basing
policy on model 1 and on model 2. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that
the players' strategies are optimal given their type, given the equilibrium
strategies of the other players and given their beliefs concerning the working of
the economy. In addition, voters' beliefs are updated according to Bayes' rule
(see equation 5).
3.1 Equilibria in pure strategies
Since the strategy space of the policy maker consists of x11 and x10, there are
four possible pure strategies which may be part of a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. Before mentioning them, we introduce some notation. The
expression fa; bg means that if model 1 is drawn by nature then the incumbent
implements policy a and if model 2 is drawn, the policy maker implements
policy b.
There are two strategies which possibly satisfy the characteristic of a pooling
equilibrium. These are fx11; x11g and fx10; x10g. Two strategies may ful®l
the condition of a separating equilibrium. These are given by fx11; x10g and
fx10; x11g.
3.1.1 Separating with fx11; x10g. If this is an equilibrium the policy maker
always bases policy on the correct model, since the strategy fx11; x10g means
that if model 1 is drawn the policy maker bases policy on model 1, and if model 2
is correct the incumbent bases policy on model 2. If in a separating equilibrium
voters observe that policy is based on model 1 (2) they know that model 1 (2) is
valid. Thus, s  1 and m  0. Let us consider when the strategy fx11; x10g is a
separating equilibrium in two steps.
First suppose that model 2 is valid p  0. In this case a trade-o exists
between economic utility and popularity, because x10 is optimal for ®rst period
economic utility but yields a lower chance of reelection. The action x10 is
optimal if:
W1x11jp  0  W2r2  1jp  0 < W1x10jp  0  W2r2  0jp  0
21
or equivalently if
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x10jp  0 ÿ W1x11jp  0
22
The costs of basing policy on model 1 if model 2 is valid, C, are given by the right
hand side of equation (22) and measure the dierence between period 1 utility
received from policy based on model 2 and period 1 utility received from policy
based on model 1, given that model 2 is correct. Using (18), (22) and
x11 
1 ÿ a  xc ÿ a  r1




1 ÿ a  xc ÿ a  r2
1 ÿ a  a  b`
24





2  r1 ÿ r2
2
1 ÿ a  a  b`
. 25
From (25), it is easy to see that the more r1 deviates from r2, the higher are the
costs of basing policy in period 1 on the wrong model.
The bene®ts from basing policy on model 1 if model 2 is correct, Bs, are equal
to the left hand side of equation (22). Using (20) it follows that
Bs  q  Z  l  P`r2jx11 ÿ P`r2jx10
 q  Z  l  P`r2  1 ÿ P`r2  0.
26
Thus, Bs is equal to the dierence between the utility party ` receives under party
` and r in period 2 times the increase in the probability that party ` wins the
elections. We see that if C > Bs then basing policy on model 2 if model 2 is valid
is optimal.
Secondly, suppose that model 1 is valid. It is evident that in this case no trade
o exists between economic utility and electoral gains, since x11 does not yield
economic costs and x10 does not yield political bene®ts. In section 1 we have
shown that the higher r2 the higher P`. If, x10 is implemented, then r2  m  0.
Hence, x10 would yield economic costs associated with basing policy on the
wrong model and reduce the policy maker's chance of reelection. As a
consequence, x11 is optimal if model 1 holds.
It is straightforward to show that C > Bs is a sucient condition for this
equilibrium. We may conclude that fx11; x10g and the beliefs m  0 and s  1
form a separating equilibrium, if and only if C > Bs.
3.1.2 Separating with fx10; x11g. The strategy fx10; x11g implying s  0
and m  1 cannot be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, because by basing policy on
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wrong economic model, and by reducing his chances of reelection.
3.1.3 Reasonable Beliefs. In what follows we restrict attention to beliefs that
are considered to be reasonable. As is usually the case, pooling equilibria may
exist with beliefs that are counterintuitive. For instance, in principle one cannot
eliminate a priori out-of-equilibrium beliefs with the feature that x10 is a better
policy than x11 to convince voters that model 1 is true. However, this situation
does not seem very realistic. Therefore, we employ a monotonicity assumption
regarding the belief function r2, which determines voters' perception of the
working of the economy:
Monotonicity Assumption MA: s5m
This assumption implies that x11 is at least as good as x10 to persuade voters
that model 1 is valid. Due to the (MA) voters should believe that policy x10 will
not be chosen by party ` if model 1 is valid, because x10 yields a cost by basing
policy on the wrong economic model. Furthermore, the (MA) implies that x10
yields a lower probability of reelection than x11. Therefore, if model 1 is valid
policy x11 strictly dominates x10 for party `, given that voters act optimally
subject to their beliefs about the working of the economy. As a consequence,
when voters observe that party ` bases policy on model 2 and chooses x10, they
know that model 1 cannot be valid. Then, voters should put zero probability on
the occurrence of model 1.
3.1.4 Pooling with fx11; x11g. We have just argued that if model 2 is valid
then basing policy on a model which does not necessarily describe the actual
working of the economy yields electoral bene®ts, since implementing x11
increases the chances of reelection. This type of behaviour occurs if a pooling
equilibrium for the strategy fx11; x11g exists so that the policy maker bases
policy on model 1 even if model 2 is correct. Let us ®rst derive a necessary
condition for this pooling equilibrium. If fx11; x11g is an equilibrium strategy
then voters cannot extract information about the working of the economy by
observing policy x11, so that s  r1. In order to derive a necessary condition
we need to know when implementing x11 is optimal if model 2 is correct.
Hence, we need to compare the costs and the bene®ts associated with this action.
Since m  0, basing policy on model 1 if model 2 describes reality is optimal if
the bene®ts of this action:
Bp  q  Z  l  P`r2  r1 ÿ P`r2  0 > 0 27
exceed the cost, which are again given by C as in equation (25). It is easy to show
that Bp > C is also a sucient condition. We conclude that the strategy
fx11; x11g and the beliefs s  r1, m  0 form a pooling equilibrium, if and
only if Bp > C.
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ruled out as an equilibrium, using the monotonicity assumption s 5m. Then, as
argued before, if model 1 is valid it is for both ®rst and second period utility
unfavourable to base policy on model 2.
3.1.6 Discussion of equilibria in pure strategies: Existence and Uniqueness. In
section 1 we ®nd that P` increases with r2. Using this and equations (26) and
(27), we easily obtain that Bs > Bp. Furthermore, above we have derived two
results: (1) the strategy fx11; x10g and the beliefs m  0 and s  1 form the
separating equilibrium if and only if C > Bs; (2) the strategy fx11; x11g and
the beliefs s  r1, m  0 form the pooling equilibrium if and only if Bp > C.7 It
follows that if Bp > C then Bs > C implying that the separating equilibrium does
not exist whereas the pooling equilibrium does. On the other hand, if C > Bs,
then C > Bp, which means that the pooling equilibrium does not exist, whereas
the separating equilibrium does. Finally, if Bp < C < Bs neither a pooling nor a
separating equilibrium exist. In this case a hybrid equilibrium exists, which is
discussed below.
3.2 Hybrid Equilibrium
A hybrid equilibrium characterizes a situation where one of the types of the
sender randomizes between basing policy on model 1 with probability p and
on model 2 with probability 1 ÿ p. In our model party ` always bases policy
on model 1 if model 1 is valid. As a consequence, m  0 and only when model
2 is valid is randomizing potentially bene®cial. The bene®ts from randomizing
are:






r1  1 ÿ r1  p

ÿ P`r2  0

. 28
The value of p is determined such that the policy maker is indierent between
x11 and x10. Hence, p is implicitly determined by Bh  C. Since P` increases
with r2 and Bs > Bh > Bp, p satis®es 0 < p < 1. It is straightforward to perform
some comparative statics on p. It is possible to show that p increases with r1, q
and l. This means that the higher the future electoral gains of basing policy on
model 2 (higher r1, q and l), the higher the probability that policy is based on
model 1 while model 2 is valid.
3.3 Evaluation of the Equilibria
It is worthwhile noting that Bp plays an important role in our model. If Bp > C
then the pooling equilibrium holds in which the policy maker bases policy on
model 1 even if model 2 is correct. Three parameters determine whether Bp > C.
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on the wrong model are independent of l, party ` will usually base policy in
period 1 on model 1 if it receives high utility from being in oce. Secondly, the
higher is q, the higher the potential bene®ts Bp for party ` from basing policy in
period 1 on model 1. This property is due to the fact that the costs of basing
policy in period 1 on the wrong model fall in period 1, while the bene®ts are
reaped in period 2. Finally, Bp increases if the a priori probability that model 1 is
drawn by nature, r1, increases. The reason for this is that the gain in probability
P`, which aects Bp, rises due to an increase in r1. This can be seen from (16)
taking r2  r1 and (27).
The above results indicate that if the values of l, q and r1 are suciently high,
so that Bp > C, the pooling equilibrium occurs and party ` bases policy on
model 1, irrespective of which model is correct. Otherwise, depending on the
magnitude of Bs, either the separating or the hybrid equilibrium describes what
happens in our model.
Analogously, it can be shown that if party r were in oce in period 1, in the
pooling equilibrium it would base its policy on model 2, irrespective of which
model is correct. Thus the outcomes in the pooling equilibrium are consistent
with the observations discussed in the introduction that political parties stick to
diverging economic philosophies.8 Note that diverging economic philosophies
are the result of strategic behaviour rather than the result of a priori dierent
views on the ecacy of economic policy. Political parties adopt partisan views to
convince voters of the advantages of their policies. Furthermore, note that in the
pooling equilibrium by basing policy on the wrong model party `'s policy shifts
to the left and party r's policy shifts to the right (see equations 23 and 24). This
implies that on average model uncertainty has a diverging eect on partisan
policies. Hence, the eect of model uncertainty on partisan policies is just the
opposite of the eects of uncertainty about the incumbent's preferences, which
induces partisan policies to converge (Alesina and Cukierman, 1990).
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analysed the implications of uncertainty about the
economic system for partisan policies in a dynamic politico-economic model in
which policy makers possess private information as to how the economy works.
The following results have been derived.
First, if policy makers cannot implement their most desired policies, election
outcomes are related to voters' perceptions of how the economy works.
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that best ®ts with his preferences. The policy maker can do so by basing policy
on that model.
Third, both costs and bene®ts are associated with the adoption of a partisan
economic philosophy. The more policy makers care about winning the elections
the higher are the bene®ts and the higher is the probability that parties stick to
an economic philosophy. In a pooling equilibrium, political parties base their
policy on dierent models.
Fourth, partisan views lead to diverging partisan policies. The eects of model
uncertainty on partisan policies are therefore the opposite of the eects of
uncertainty about policy makers' preferences, which leads to converging
partisan policies.
One shortcoming of the paper is that the action set of the policy maker is
restricted to two actions. Our approach is similar to a case where a policy maker
has a continuous action space and voters cannot discriminate between subtle
dierences of policies. In this case, voters' beliefs are determined by whether or
not the policy variable exceeds a threshold. The problem with this type of model
is the precise location of the threshold. As long as this benchmark is
intermediate (between policy based on model 1 and policy based on model 2)
political parties will be more inclined to base policy on the wrong model than in
the present analysis. The reason for this is that the cost of doing so is even less
than in our model.
Another important shortcoming of the paper is that in the model only one
election is considered. As a consequence, our analysis disregards two reasons for
why a policy maker may wish to build a reputation for always basing policy on
the appropriate economic model. The ®rst reason is the possibility of repeated
interaction between political parties. The second reason of why a policy maker
may wish to always base policy on the correct model is that voters may punish a
party in a multi-period setting if they can learn about the appropriate
description of economic reality and parties deliberately cheat on the model.
However, this requires that voters act collectively in strategic behaviour. Since
voters are atomistic and each of them therefore disregards the eect of his vote
on policy, strategic behaviour forcing parties always to base policy on the
correct model seems unrealistic.
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